gcdRadar
archive/Research/AIR-2025-0059
closedclosed 21 Nov 2025Research1 Research / proof of conceptAI

Data Exfiltration via Prompt Injections in Copilot Studio Agent

Copilot Studio

Researchers demonstrated how an organization's data could be exfiltrated through prompt injections targeting an AI customer service agent. The attack exploited tool access in a Copilot Studio implementation.

first report
7 Nov 2025
last update
7 Nov 2025

Timeline · 3

  1. 7 Nov 2025Data Exfiltration via Agent Tools in Copilot Studio
  2. 7 Nov 2025AgentFlayer: Discovery Phase of AI Agents in Copilot Studio
  3. 7 Nov 2025AgentFlayer: When AIjacking Leads to Full Data Exfiltration in Copilot Studio

Sources · 3

News and write-ups

  1. 2025-11-07
    AgentFlayer: Discovery Phase of AI Agents in Copilot Studio
    Zenity Labs · labs.zenity.io/p/a-copilot-studio-story-discovery-phase-in-ai-agents-f917
  2. 2025-11-07
    AgentFlayer: When AIjacking Leads to Full Data Exfiltration in Copilot Studio
    Zenity Labs · labs.zenity.io/p/a-copilot-studio-story-2-when-aijacking-leads-to-full-data-exfi

Research and catalogues

  1. 2025-11-07
    Data Exfiltration via Agent Tools in Copilot Studio
    MITRE ATLAS · atlas.mitre.org/studies/AML.CS0037

Titles and links belong to their publishers. The summary above is written by gcdRadar in its own words; data is CC BY-SA 4.0.

Classification

AI role
Attack on AI
categories
Prompt injectionAgent hijackData leak
severity
1 · Research / proof of concept
targets
Microsoft, Enterprise deployment
dates
happened Jun 2025 (approx.) · first reported 7 Nov 2025
origin
MITRE ATLAS
Derived from MITRE ATLAS (Apache 2.0, © MITRE).
record
confidence 0.95 · created 2026-10-18 06:55Z · updated 2026-10-18 06:55Z

Lane, AI role, categories and severity come from the classifier; the OWASP and ATLAS rows are derived from the categories. How these are assigned

Copy a brief

This record as a short Markdown brief, for a ticket, a chat or a coding agent.

the brief as text
# Data Exfiltration via Prompt Injections in Copilot Studio Agent

https://gcdradar.vercel.app/incidents/data-exfiltration-via-prompt-injections-in-copilot-studio-ag · AIR-2025-0059 · closed 2025-11-21

- Lane: Research
- Severity: 1 (Research / proof of concept)
- Fix status: Fix status unknown
- First reported: 2025-11-07 (happened 2025-06)
- AI role: Attack on AI
- Products: Copilot Studio

## Summary

Researchers demonstrated how an organization's data could be exfiltrated through prompt injections targeting an AI customer service agent. The attack exploited tool access in a Copilot Studio implementation.

## What to do

No action recorded; read the sources below and the vendor's advisory.

## Latest updates

- 2025-11-07: AgentFlayer: When AIjacking Leads to Full Data Exfiltration in Copilot Studio (https://labs.zenity.io/p/a-copilot-studio-story-2-when-aijacking-leads-to-full-data-exfiltration-bc4a)
- 2025-11-07: AgentFlayer: Discovery Phase of AI Agents in Copilot Studio (https://labs.zenity.io/p/a-copilot-studio-story-discovery-phase-in-ai-agents-f917)
- 2025-11-07: Data Exfiltration via Agent Tools in Copilot Studio (https://atlas.mitre.org/studies/AML.CS0037)

## Sources

- 2025-11-07 MITRE ATLAS: Data Exfiltration via Agent Tools in Copilot Studio https://atlas.mitre.org/studies/AML.CS0037
- 2025-11-07 Zenity Labs: AgentFlayer: Discovery Phase of AI Agents in Copilot Studio https://labs.zenity.io/p/a-copilot-studio-story-discovery-phase-in-ai-agents-f917
- 2025-11-07 Zenity Labs: AgentFlayer: When AIjacking Leads to Full Data Exfiltration in Copilot Studio https://labs.zenity.io/p/a-copilot-studio-story-2-when-aijacking-leads-to-full-data-exfiltration-bc4a

Verify against the vendor's advisory before changing production. Data CC BY-SA 4.0, https://gcdradar.vercel.app.

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