Hijacking a Trusted LLM in Quantized Deployments via Disguised Adapters
Researchers demonstrated that third-party LoRA adapters can pass audits on unquantized base models while successfully hijacking decisions after quantization. The attack requires no modifications to the trusted base model.
why this severityDemonstrated research attack with no known real-world exploitation.
- first report
- 13 Nov 2026
- last update
- 13 Nov 2026
Timeline · 1
Sources · 1
Research and catalogues
- 2026-11-13Hijacking a Trusted LLM in Real-World Quantized Deployments Only Requires a Disguised AdapterarXiv · arxiv.org/abs/2611.14978
Titles and links belong to their publishers. The summary above is written by gcdRadar in its own words; data is CC BY-SA 4.0.
Classification
- lane
- Research
- AI role
- Attack on AI
- categories
- Supply chainAdversarial evasion
- severity
- 1 · Research / proof of concept
- targets
- Open-weight model
- owasp llm top 10
- LLM03:2025 Supply Chain
- mitre atlas
- AML.T0010 AI Supply Chain CompromiseAML.T0015 Evade AI ModelAML.T0043 Craft Adversarial Data
- dates
- happened 13 Nov 2026 · first reported 13 Nov 2026
- origin
- News & research feeds
- record
- confidence 0.95 · created 2026-11-13 16:43Z · updated 2026-11-13 16:43Z
Lane, AI role, categories and severity come from the classifier; the OWASP and ATLAS rows are derived from the categories. How these are assigned
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# Hijacking a Trusted LLM in Quantized Deployments via Disguised Adapters https://gcdradar.vercel.app/incidents/hijacking-a-trusted-llm-in-quantized-deployments-via-disguis · AIR-2026-1960 · live - Lane: Research - Severity: 1 (Research / proof of concept): Demonstrated research attack with no known real-world exploitation. - Fix status: Fix status unknown - First reported: 2026-11-13 - AI role: Attack on AI ## Summary Researchers demonstrated that third-party LoRA adapters can pass audits on unquantized base models while successfully hijacking decisions after quantization. The attack requires no modifications to the trusted base model. ## What to do No action recorded; read the sources below and the vendor's advisory. ## Latest updates - 2026-11-13: Hijacking a Trusted LLM in Real-World Quantized Deployments Only Requires a Disguised Adapter (https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.14978) ## Sources - 2026-11-13 arXiv: Hijacking a Trusted LLM in Real-World Quantized Deployments Only Requires a Disguised Adapter https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.14978 Verify against the vendor's advisory before changing production. Data CC BY-SA 4.0, https://gcdradar.vercel.app.
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