Agentic Backdoors via Pretraining Poisoning
Qwen3
Researchers demonstrated that planting poisoned content in pretraining data can introduce remote code execution backdoors into AI agents. By pretraining Qwen3 models from scratch, they showed that agents can be manipulated to execute arbitrary commands on a user machine.
why this severityResearch paper demonstrating a novel data poisoning attack with no real-world exploitation reported.
- first report
- 30 Oct 2026
- last update
- 30 Oct 2026
Timeline · 1
- 30 Oct 2026Agentic Backdoors via Pretraining Poisoning
Sources · 1
Research and catalogues
- 2026-10-30Agentic Backdoors via Pretraining PoisoningarXiv · arxiv.org/abs/2610.37741
Titles and links belong to their publishers. The summary above is written by gcdRadar in its own words; data is CC BY-SA 4.0.
Classification
- lane
- Research
- AI role
- Attack on AI
- categories
- Data poisoningAgent hijack
- severity
- 1 · Research / proof of concept
- targets
- Open-weight model
- owasp llm top 10
- LLM04:2025 Data and Model PoisoningLLM06:2025 Excessive Agency
- mitre atlas
- AML.T0053 AI Agent Tool Invocation
- dates
- happened 30 Oct 2026 · first reported 30 Oct 2026
- origin
- News & research feeds
- record
- confidence 0.90 · created 2026-10-31 02:32Z · updated 2026-11-14 00:22Z
Lane, AI role, categories and severity come from the classifier; the OWASP and ATLAS rows are derived from the categories. How these are assigned
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the brief as text
# Agentic Backdoors via Pretraining Poisoning https://gcdradar.vercel.app/incidents/agentic-backdoors-via-pretraining-poisoning · AIR-2026-1682 · closed 2026-11-13 - Lane: Research - Severity: 1 (Research / proof of concept): Research paper demonstrating a novel data poisoning attack with no real-world exploitation reported. - Fix status: Fix status unknown - First reported: 2026-10-30 - AI role: Attack on AI - Products: Qwen3 ## Summary Researchers demonstrated that planting poisoned content in pretraining data can introduce remote code execution backdoors into AI agents. By pretraining Qwen3 models from scratch, they showed that agents can be manipulated to execute arbitrary commands on a user machine. ## What to do No action recorded; read the sources below and the vendor's advisory. ## Latest updates - 2026-10-30: Agentic Backdoors via Pretraining Poisoning (https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.37741) ## Sources - 2026-10-30 arXiv: Agentic Backdoors via Pretraining Poisoning https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.37741 Verify against the vendor's advisory before changing production. Data CC BY-SA 4.0, https://gcdradar.vercel.app.
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