CapLite: Evaluating Prompt-Injection Vulnerabilities in Small Language Models
Researchers evaluated whether small language model agents can reliably write security artifacts for enforcement defenses. Testing across 15 open-weight models showed that generated policies frequently admit prompt injection attacks.
why this severityResearch paper demonstrating model limitations and vulnerabilities without real-world exploitation.
- first report
- 13 Nov 2026
- last update
- 13 Nov 2026
Timeline · 1
Sources · 1
Research and catalogues
- 2026-11-13CapLite: Prompt-Injection Defense for Small Language Model Agents without Model-Written Security ArtifactsarXiv · arxiv.org/abs/2611.17115
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Classification
- lane
- Research
- AI role
- Attack on AI
- categories
- Prompt injectionAgent hijack
- severity
- 1 · Research / proof of concept
- targets
- Open-weight model
- owasp llm top 10
- LLM01:2025 Prompt InjectionLLM06:2025 Excessive Agency
- dates
- happened 13 Nov 2026 · first reported 13 Nov 2026
- origin
- News & research feeds
- record
- confidence 0.90 · created 2026-11-13 16:43Z · updated 2026-11-13 16:43Z
Lane, AI role, categories and severity come from the classifier; the OWASP and ATLAS rows are derived from the categories. How these are assigned
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# CapLite: Evaluating Prompt-Injection Vulnerabilities in Small Language Models https://gcdradar.vercel.app/incidents/caplite-evaluating-prompt-injection-vulnerabilities-in-small · AIR-2026-1965 · live - Lane: Research - Severity: 1 (Research / proof of concept): Research paper demonstrating model limitations and vulnerabilities without real-world exploitation. - Fix status: Fix status unknown - First reported: 2026-11-13 - AI role: Attack on AI ## Summary Researchers evaluated whether small language model agents can reliably write security artifacts for enforcement defenses. Testing across 15 open-weight models showed that generated policies frequently admit prompt injection attacks. ## What to do No action recorded; read the sources below and the vendor's advisory. ## Latest updates - 2026-11-13: CapLite: Prompt-Injection Defense for Small Language Model Agents without Model-Written Security Artifacts (https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.17115) ## Sources - 2026-11-13 arXiv: CapLite: Prompt-Injection Defense for Small Language Model Agents without Model-Written Security Artifacts https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.17115 Verify against the vendor's advisory before changing production. Data CC BY-SA 4.0, https://gcdradar.vercel.app.
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