Beyond Instruction Override: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injection
Researchers explore task-tampering attacks where indirect prompt injection alters ongoing process outcomes rather than purely redirecting agent tasks. The work proposes a broader definition of prompt injection based on authority rather than exact instruction phrasing.
why this severityResearch paper demonstrating indirect prompt injection task-tampering attacks.
- first report
- 6 Nov 2026
- last update
- 6 Nov 2026
Timeline · 1
Sources · 1
Research and catalogues
- 2026-11-06Beyond Instruction Override: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injection with Task-Tampering AttacksarXiv · arxiv.org/abs/2611.07640
Titles and links belong to their publishers. The summary above is written by gcdRadar in its own words; data is CC BY-SA 4.0.
Classification
- lane
- Research
- AI role
- Attack on AI
- categories
- Prompt injectionAgent hijack
- severity
- 1 · Research / proof of concept
- targets
- Open-weight model, Framework / tooling
- owasp llm top 10
- LLM01:2025 Prompt InjectionLLM06:2025 Excessive Agency
- dates
- happened 6 Nov 2026 · first reported 6 Nov 2026
- origin
- News & research feeds
- record
- confidence 0.90 · created 2026-11-06 16:25Z · updated 2026-11-06 16:25Z
Lane, AI role, categories and severity come from the classifier; the OWASP and ATLAS rows are derived from the categories. How these are assigned
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the brief as text
# Beyond Instruction Override: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injection https://gcdradar.vercel.app/incidents/beyond-instruction-override-benchmarking-indirect-prompt-inj · AIR-2026-1808 · live - Lane: Research - Severity: 1 (Research / proof of concept): Research paper demonstrating indirect prompt injection task-tampering attacks. - Fix status: Fix status unknown - First reported: 2026-11-06 - AI role: Attack on AI ## Summary Researchers explore task-tampering attacks where indirect prompt injection alters ongoing process outcomes rather than purely redirecting agent tasks. The work proposes a broader definition of prompt injection based on authority rather than exact instruction phrasing. ## What to do No action recorded; read the sources below and the vendor's advisory. ## Latest updates - 2026-11-06: Beyond Instruction Override: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injection with Task-Tampering Attacks (https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07640) ## Sources - 2026-11-06 arXiv: Beyond Instruction Override: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injection with Task-Tampering Attacks https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07640 Verify against the vendor's advisory before changing production. Data CC BY-SA 4.0, https://gcdradar.vercel.app.
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